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1 Introduction 
Consider a variant of Parfit's 'drops of water' example (1984, p. 76), as presented by 
Nefsky (2016, pp. 1-2): 
There are ten thousand men in the desert, suffering from intensely painful thirst. We are a 
group of ten thousand people near the desert, and each of us has a pint of water. We can’t 
go into the desert ourselves, but what we can do is pour our pints into a water cart. The cart 
will be driven into the desert, and any water in it will be evenly distributed amongst the 
men. 
If we pour in our pints, the men’s suffering will be relieved. The problem is, though, that 
while together these acts would do a lot of good, it does not seem that any individual such 
act will make a difference. If one pours in one’s pint, this will only enable each man to drink 
an extra ten thousandth of a pint of water. This is no more than a single drop, and a single 
drop more or less is too miniscule an amount to make any difference to how they feel. If this 
is right, it’s unclear why any of us has reason to add our pints. Yes, these men are suffering, 
but if adding my pint will not make a difference… then what reason do I have to do so? 
The example vividly illustrates a more general ethical quandary: How can we account 
for the rightness or wrongness of acts that clearly contribute to some morally significant 
outcome – but which each seem too small, individually, to make any meaningful differ-
ence? There are a variety of views surrounding this issue.1 This paper’s aim is to pro-
vide a new reason to think that even the tiniest of contributions to some significant out-
1 Some – Glover (1975), Otsuka (1991), Arntzenius and McCarthy (1997), Norcross (2004), Kagan 
(2011), Lawford-Smith (2016), Parfit (ms.) – argue that even very small contributions to morally signifi-
cant outcomes always have some chance of making, a relevant causal difference. Others – Strang (1960), 
Cullity (2000), Kutz (2000), Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), Petersson (2013), Pinkert (2015), Nefsky (2016) – are 
willing to grant that sufficiently small contributions make no relevant causal difference, suggesting that 
we must look elsewhere to explain the apparent rightness or wrongness of such acts. See Nefsky (2015) 
for discussion of views in this latter camp. 
 come (e.g. the addition of one drop of water to someone’s canteen) must be capable of 
making a relevant causal difference (e.g. of relieving someone’s suffering to some ex-
tent). Existing arguments for this thesis tend to be sorites-style arguments. Such argu-
ments imagine varying a subject’s predicament bit by bit until it is clear that a relevant 
difference has been achieved.2 The arguments offered in this paper are structurally dif-
ferent. For this reason, they are not vulnerable to objections that have been leveled 
against the sorites-style arguments. 
2 Background 
The general problem raised above can arise in the context of many real-life decisions: 
Should I walk or drive? Should I order tofu or chicken? Should I vote or stay at home? 
In making such decisions, we may be tempted to think that it does not matter how we 
decide (e.g. ‘It’s not like my choice will have any real effect on anyone, so what differ-
ence does it make?’). It is important to distinguish two types of case that might prompt 
one to have this thought: threshold and non-threshold cases.3 Naturally, both types of case 
involve some collection of acts that suffices to bring about some morally significant out-
come. What differs is how the acts combine to produce that outcome. 
In threshold cases, there are sharp boundaries, or thresholds, such that, when they 
are crossed, morally significant effects are triggered. Voting contexts provide a clear ex-
                                                
2 Arntzenius and McCarthy (1997), Norcross (1997), Kagan (2011). 
3 Nefsky (2016, p. 4). 
 ample. When such thresholds are present, there will typically be some chance – howev-
er small – that one will perform a threshold-crossing act (e.g. by casting the deciding 
vote in an election). For this reason, at least some threshold cases tend to be amenable to 
a simple expectational treatment (e.g. ‘True, your vote is unlikely to matter, but if you 
do cast the deciding vote, then your vote will matter a great deal.’).4 
Cases of the second type can seem more philosophically troubling. In this type of 
case, when a person dismisses the idea that her act will make a difference, it may seem 
that there is no chance at all that her act will make any real difference. Nefsky’s version 
of the ‘drops of water’ example is offered as a case of this sort (2016, p. 4):  
There is no chance that pouring your pint into the cart will make a difference to the allevia-
tion of the men’s suffering. A single pint added only allows each man to drink a single drop 
more, and – however much water he is receiving – one drop more or less is simply not 
enough to change his level of suffering. 
These non-threshold cases have a gradual structure that lacks sharp boundaries. In such 
cases, even though some collection of acts is sufficient to bring about a morally signifi-
cant outcome, no individual act is supposed to make any real difference (a difference in 
someone’s level of suffering), on its own.5 Cases with this feature – if genuinely possible 
– raise difficult questions about how to account for the rightness or wrongness of the 
                                                
4 For extended developments of this idea, see Singer (1980, pp. 325-327), Parfit (1984, pp. 73-75), Gib-
bard (1990, pp. 26-27), Norcross (2004, pp. 232-3), Kagan (2011, p. 124). Nefsky (forthcoming) and Bu-
dolfson (forthcoming) argue that the move to expected consequences does not adequately handle all 
threshold cases, often permitting or recommending inaction when action seems called for. 
5 Often, the claim is only that no individual act makes a perceptible difference. This paper sidesteps the 
issue of perceptibility, focusing directly on whether any act, on its own, makes a morally significant dif-
ference.  
 contributing acts.6 Some have argued that such cases are possible. For instance, Sinnott-
Armstrong suggests that the harm caused by global warming results from a collection 
of individually harmless acts:7 
You might think that my driving on Sunday raises the temperature of the globe by an infini-
tesimal amount. I doubt that, but, even if it does, my exhaust on that Sunday does not cause 
any climate change at all. No storms or floods or droughts or heat waves can be traced to 
my individual act of driving. It is these climate changes that cause harms to people. Global 
warming by itself causes no harm without climate change. Hence, since my individual act of 
driving on that one Sunday does not cause any climate change, it causes no harm to anyone. 
(2005, p. 291) 
On the other hand, there are difficulties associated with allowing for cases like this. 
There is something strange about the thought that, say, a collection of individually 
harmless acts could cause a grave harm. In order to examine an important argument 
against the possibility of cases of this type, it is helpful to describe explicitly the core 
principle operative in the ‘drops of water’ example. 
No Small Improvement: The addition or subtraction of a single drop of water to/from 
someone’s canteen cannot (on its own) make her suffering better or worse. 
If one endorses a principle like this, it is clear that one will be vulnerable to a problem 
akin to that posed by the sorites paradox: Repeated appeal to the principle seems to gen-
erate absurd conclusions. Arntzenius and McCarthy (1997), Norcross (1997), and Kagan 
(2011) all argue along these lines that no such principles could be true. Though their ar-
guments are framed in terms of Quinn’s (1990) self-torturer example, we can examine a 
                                                
6 Cullity (2000), Kutz (2000), Petersson (2013), Pinkert (2015), Nefsky (2016). 
7 See Lawford-Smith (2016) for an empirically-informed argument against Sinnott-Armstrong’s posi-
tion. 
 representative version of their arguments that applies to the example at hand. 
Sorites-Style Argument: Suppose, for reductio, that No Small Improvement is true. Suppose 
we have before us a thirsty traveler. We ask her whether she is in pain (due to her intense 
thirst), and she tells us that she is.  
We then ask: What would she say, if she had one additional drop of water? Via No 
Small Improvement, we can be sure that her suffering would not have been any less bad. So, 
presumably, she still would answer our question in just the same way. Similarly, if she had 
two extra drops, her suffering would still be as bad as in the one-drop-added case. So, again, 
presumably, she would answer our question identically if she had two extra drops.  
If we continue reasoning this way, we will infer that she would answer the question 
identically, even if she had a full pint of water to drink. Since this is an absurd result to 
reach, No Small Improvement must be incorrect. 
An interesting reply to this argument comes from Nefsky (2011, pp. 379–394). She ob-
serves that there are two ways of running the foregoing argument – one direct and one 
behavioral. And, she argues, each version suffers from a different defect. Though the ar-
gument given above makes reference to how the thirsty traveler would describe her situ-
ation, Nefsky notes that this appeal to behavior might be seen as an inessential feature 
of the argument. The purest, most direct version of the argument goes like this:  
Direct Version: When the traveler has no water, she is clearly suffering. If No Small Im-
provement is true, then her suffering is not relieved at all by any drop added. It follows that 
her suffering must be just as bad at the end of the series, when she has a full pint. This is ab-
surd. 
Per Nefsky, the problem with this argument is that ‘it amounts to giving a sorites ar-
gument as though it were a simple reductio proof that there cannot be vague bounda-
ries’ (2011, p. 385). After all, not everyone thinks that the sorites paradox shows, say, 
that, in fact, it is possible to make someone bald by removing a single strand of his hair. 
 So, in short, the direct argument relies on controversial assumptions about how the so-
rites paradox should be handled. 
One way to remedy this issue is to invoke the traveler’s behavior in the argument: 
Behavioral Version: The traveler’s answer to the question (‘Are you in pain?’) will differ 
substantially when her canteen is empty and when it is full. This can only happen if there is 
at least one sharp point at which the traveler’s response to the question changes. Such a 
sharp change is incompatible with No Small Improvement. 
But, Nefsky notes, the behavioral route faces other difficulties. While it seems clearly 
true that the traveler’s answer must change somewhere, it is unclear what to infer from 
this fact. Nefsky asks: ‘why should we accept that differences in the victim’s pain re-
ports are perfect indicators of differences in his sensations?’ (2011, p. 380). To address 
this question, one would need to unpack the behavioral argument in more detail: Is the 
imagined procedure supposed to be something we could actually carry out with a real 
person? Or is the point a purely conceptual one? Either way, this is controversial territo-
ry.8 Given that the issues are controversial, it would be nice if there were some alterna-
tive way to put pressure on No Small Improvement – one that steers clear of the contro-
versies presented above.  
As it happens, such an alternative form of argument is available – one which puts 
pressure on No Small Improvement by drawing out one of its peculiar consequences. 
Specifically, No Small Improvement entails that we can generate a free lunch. That is, if 
No Small Improvement is true, then we will often be able to reduce a person’s suffering 
                                                
8 For a more thorough investigation into these issues, see Nefsky (2011, pp. 379-394). 
 from thirst significantly, at no cost to anyone else – just by moving water around. In cer-
tain contexts, this result can seem implausible. 
3 Two ‘Free Lunch’ Arguments 
In this section, we suppose that No Small Improvement is correct: Giving or taking a 
drop of water cannot change the severity of a thirsty person’s suffering. But before we 
can examine the ‘free lunch’ arguments, an important clarification is in order.  
Suppose that Brutus and Jocko are among those suffering in the desert. Each has 
been given some water. And suppose that we take away a single drop from each of 
them. From the standpoint of total suffering, does this change anything? Given No 
Small Improvement, the situation should not be relevantly different: Brutus’s suffering 
is unchanged; Jocko’s suffering is unchanged. Since the suffering is the same for each 
person, their total suffering, presumably, is also unchanged. Of course, this property 
should not only apply to groups of two: If we take one drop of water from each member 
of some group (or give one drop to each member of a group), it should not change the 
total suffering of the group – no matter how many people are in the group. With this 
clarification in place, we can consider the first ‘free lunch’ argument. 
Optimization: 10,000 desert travelers are suffering from intensely painful thirst. Each of 
their empty canteens holds up to a pint of water, which consists of ten thousand drops. We 
have 5,000 pints of water, which we can distribute however we wish.  
We can’t satisfy everyone. But, still, some distributions may be better than others with 
respect to the goal of relieving as much suffering as possible. (Perhaps the travelers have 
differing levels of tolerance for thirst.) In any event, suppose that, somehow, we succeed in 
implementing an optimal distribution of water (that is, a distribution that relieves at least as 
 much suffering as any other). But then we tinker with it. Via No Small Improvement, we can 
remove one drop of water from each traveler’s canteen (or, at least, from the non-empty 
ones) without making her suffering worse. We can then give the drops collected (which to-
tal at least half a pint9) to one traveler who would benefit from receiving more. 
We have generated a free lunch. As a result of our tinkering, the lucky recipient has 
benefited, while no one’s suffering was made worse. So the initial distribution must not 
have been optimal, which was supposed to be a stipulation of the setup. In making this 
argument, one needn’t rely on any sorites series – nor need one rely on controversial 
assumptions linking suffering and behavior. So the argument is immune from the objec-
tions that were raised against the sorites-style arguments.  
The argument does, however, make an assumption that can be questioned: It as-
sumes the existence of an optimal distribution (that is, a distribution not worse than any 
other, in terms of suffering relief). This assumption seems plausible on certain concep-
tions of suffering – especially those that allow suffering to be quantified precisely in 
principle. But, arguably, such conceptions of suffering will be unattractive to propo-
nents of No Small Improvement, who may think of suffering as, by its very nature, im-
precise. They may not agree that there is an unequivocal fact of the matter concerning 
which of several distributions relieve the more suffering than the others. If this is right, 
the proponent of No Small Improvement has a way of escaping the seeming absurdity 
posed by the Optimization argument. 
                                                
9 No matter how we distribute the 5,000 pints of water, we will have to give some water to at least 
5,000 people (since we cannot give more than a pint to anyone). For this reason, when we extract one 
drop from everyone who has some, we will end up collecting at least 5,000 drops (which is half a pint). 
 However, a further worry looms – one that the defender of No Small Improvement 
cannot shrug off so easily. While the Optimization argument may not prove decisive, it 
illustrates something important – namely, how No Small Improvement gives rise to free 
lunches. We can always extract one drop from many people and then give those drops 
to a lucky recipient. This fact can be exploited by a second free lunch argument to gen-
erate an especially thorny problem. 
Staircase: The 10,000 travelers are suffering from intensely painful thirst. They come upon a 
massive, 10,000-step staircase. Each step contains a partially filled canteen. The canteen on 
Step 1 contains 1 drop; the canteen on Step 2 contains 2 drops; and so on. 
The travelers manage to arrange themselves on the staircase, with one traveler per step. 
Just before they take a drink, the traveler on Step 1 proposes an idea: ‘Wait! I was thinking… 
What if you all just moved down one step, and I moved up to the top?’ She proceeds to ex-
plain that on this proposal, no one would be harmed (for all others forfeit only one drop), 
while she would benefit.10 
Again, we have a situation that gives rise to a free lunch: If the travelers shift them-
selves as suggested, the traveler sent to the top benefits, while no one’s suffering is 
made worse. But this can seem implausible when we note that the situation before the 
shift seems relevantly similar to the situation after it: There is still one traveler per stair. 
If it helps, we can imagine that the travelers are all perfect clones, and experience pain 
from thirst identically. From the standpoint of total suffering, shuffling people around 
on the staircase does not seem likely to improve matters. Yet No Small Improvement 
seems to imply that shifting everyone as described would reduce the total suffering. 
                                                
10 Structurally similar examples are discussed (though for different reasons) by Parfit (2003, p. 383, fn. 
16), Temkin (2012, pp. 440-445), Voorhoeve (2014, pp. 82-84), and Barnett (forthcoming). 
 Like the Optimization argument, the Staircase argument does not rely on a sorites 
series – nor does it rely on any controversial assumptions linking suffering and behav-
ior. Unlike the Optimization argument, however, the Staircase argument also does not 
require us to assume that total suffering can be quantified precisely in principle, or that 
there is some ‘best’ distribution of water which relieves as much suffering as any other. 
The Staircase argument assumes only that if one person’s suffering is relieved substan-
tially while no one else’s suffering is affected, then the total suffering is reduced. It is 
hard to see how this assumption can be denied. But, if it is right, it seems clear that No 
Small Improvement is incorrect. One drop of water can make a difference to someone’s 
suffering. So it turns out that there is a satisfyingly direct answer available to the moral 
quandary non-threshold cases seemed to pose: What moral reason do I have to pour in 
my pint? Answer: If I refrain, the travelers will suffer more. Even tiny contributions are 
morally significant. 
4 Small Differences and Competing Claims to Aid 
Even if we consider the preceding question settled, nearby issues merit exploration. 
Compare two versions of the ‘drops of water’ example. In the first (which is just the 
original scenario), the ten thousand contributors provide diffuse aid: Each pools her pint 
in the water cart, thereby helping every traveler a tiny bit. In the second version, the 
contributors provide concentrated aid: Each gives her entire pint to one traveler directly, 
thereby helping that traveler a great deal. In both situations, so long as everyone con-
 tributes, the travelers will all be helped equally. But the types of contribution being 
made are different across the two cases. And, though the contributions may relieve 
equal suffering, it does not necessarily follow (unless we are utilitarian) that each type 
of contribution has equal moral importance. 
Indeed, there is something attractive about the thought that concentrated contribu-
tions matter more, morally, than diffuse ones do – other things the same. Giving a full 
pint of water to someone with none seems extremely valuable; giving a single drop to 
each of ten thousand travelers (who already have some) can seem less so – even if both 
acts relieve equal suffering.11 Call this thesis ‘Diminished Significance of Diffuse Aid.’ 
Despite the thesis’s appeal, an argument from Parfit (2003, p. 383, fn. 16) – which re-
sembles the second free lunch argument – can be used to pose a challenge to the thesis. 
It is worth briefly discussing the problem that arises and a possible way out. 
Suppose we are deciding between two arrangements of travelers on the staircase:12 
Alphabetical: The travelers are arranged alphabetically, with Aaron at the top and Zoe at 
the bottom. 
Downshift: The travelers are arranged alphabetically, with everyone shifted down one step 
and with Zoe at the top. 
Though the outcomes are similar in many respects, if Diminished Significance of Dif-
fuse Aid is correct, then choosing the second of these options is morally preferable. 
                                                
11 For discussion of closely related issues, see Taurek (1977), Parfit (2003), Temkin (2012, pp. 45-52), 
and Voorhoeve (2014). 
12 To ensure that the principle stated above applies here, we must make the slightest of tweaks to the 
case: We’ll have 10,001 travelers instead of 10,000, and we’ll add to our staircase a Step 0, which has on it 
an empty canteen. 
 Choosing Downshift amounts to giving Zoe a whole pint more than she was guaran-
teed to receive, while choosing Alphabetical amounts to giving everyone else one drop 
more than they were guaranteed. From a certain angle, it can seem implausible that ei-
ther of these options is morally preferable to the other: The two prospective outcomes 
are rearrangements of each other – with exactly one traveler per step. If we idealize the 
case appropriately (the travelers have equal tolerance for thirst, they possess equally 
strong claims to aid, etc.), the view that it is morally better to bring about Downshift can 
seem unmotivated. At least, if it is morally better to bring about Downshift, we face a 
vivid, pointed question about why this is the case. 
A potential answer to this question can be drawn from Voorhoeve’s (2014) paper 
about how to adjudicate between competing claims to aid.13 In Voorhoeve’s framework, 
each person who stands to benefit (or lose out) from an upcoming decision has a claim 
on the decider. The strength of each person’s claim is, other things equal, proportional 
to what is at stake for her. So, in the case at hand, Zoe’s claim is the strongest – she 
stands to gain a full pint of water if things go her way. For each other traveler, only one 
drop is at stake – though together they have numbers on their side. How are we to re-
solve this conflict between one strong claim (favoring Downshift) and many weak ones 
(favoring Alphabetical)? On Voorhoeve’s view, only relevant claims matter. And, rough-
ly, a weaker claim is relevant to a stronger one just in case a person would be permitted 
                                                
13 For Voorhoeve’s treatment of a similar example, see his (2014, pp. 82-84).  
 to satisfy the weaker claim for herself rather than satisfy the stronger claim for someone 
else. (In this way, the account depends upon the widely held view that morality permits 
at least some partiality to self.) Irrelevant claims are thrown out – no matter how many 
such claims there may be. Returning to the case at hand, it seems clear that the many 
travelers’ weaker claims are irrelevant, in Voorhoeve’s sense: No traveler would be 
morally permitted to secure a single drop for herself at the cost of a full pint to someone 
else. So, in short: Zoe’s claim is relevant; the other ones are not. That is why, according 
to Voorhoeve’s ‘aggregate relevant claims’ view, we are required to implement Down-
shift. 
The approach presents an interesting and creative way of justifying the thesis of Di-
minished Significance of Diffuse Aid. Of course, the ‘aggregate relevant claims’ view 
faces its own challenges.14 For example, if one were able to choose any arrangement of 
travelers, the presence of the additional options would make choosing Downshift no 
longer preferable to choosing Alphabetical.15 So the question of whether concentrated 
contributions have greater significance than diffuse ones remains open. What is clear, 
though, is that tiny contributions, even when diffuse, do make a real difference.16 
                                                
14 For discussion of difficulties facing the proposal, see Badano (2016), Halstead (2016), and 
Voorhoeve (2017). 
15 Halstead (2016, pp. 798–99) presses a well-developed version of this worry. See Voorhoeve (2013, 
pp. 413–16 and 2014, pp. 78–79) for discussion of the initial problem, and see Voorhoeve (2017) for a reply 
to Halstead. 
16 For helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Nomy Arpaly, Anna Brinkerhoff, 
Harry Chalmers, David Christensen, Jamie Dreier, Mahan Esmailzadeh, Dave Estlund, Arianna Falbo, 
Tom Fisher, Tobias Fuchs, Kelly Gaus, Louis Gularte, Yongming Han, Ying Huang, Rachel Leadon, Han 
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